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CASES NOTED
not automatically rise to full cash value as a result of either the Sproul
or Cosen judicial determinations. Whatever the reason, be it political
expediency or administrative difficulty, the fact remains that assessments,
at least in Dade County, are still far below the statutory requirement of
full cash value. The Sproul and Cosen courts refused to accept the fact
that all property was being assessed at a figure below full cash value.
Owners who alleged discrimination in assessment were brushed aside by
the non sequitur statement that assessments were now being made at
full cash value.2" If the courts repeat the hollow statements of the Sproul
and Cosen cases, they will allow discrimination to continue. On the other
hand, to lower an assessment which is not above full cash value to the
actual level of valuation would be a violation of the statute. The hiatus
of this dichotomy can be reconciled by assessing all property at its full
cash value in accordance with the statutory requirement. The court
announced this remedy in State ex rel. Kent Corp. v. Board of County
Comm'rs.2 7 The reluctance of the Kent court to order compliance with
the strict wording of the statute, because of an inability to show that
assessments were in fact below full cash value, should be sufficiently
negated on the basis of the statements of the circuit court judges and
the administrative officers of the county.
THEODORE KLEIN
ACCRETION-A NEW SLANT
The parties in this action to quiet title were owners of adjacent
tracts of land, separated by a channel, on the Gulf of Mexico. Over a
period of years, the plaintiff's land increased in size, growing out into
the Gulf over sovereign land,' until it extended in front of, but did not
touch, the land of the defendant, almost completely blocking him from
the Gulf (see map). Held: Accretions belong to the land to which they
are joined, regardless of the fact that they also extend in front of other
lands. Ford v. Turner, 142 So.2d 335 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
The law concerning accretions has been considered settled for a
long time.' An accretion is usually defined as the natural addition of
soil, sand, and sediment to land adjacent to water, so gradual that no
one can perceive how much is added at any one time.3 In most cases,
the formations belong to the owner of the land against which they form.4
26. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
27. 160 Fla. 900, 37 So.2d 252 (1948).
1. See FLA. STAT. § 253.12 (1961).
2. See, e.g., INSTITUTES 2.1.20.
3. BoxER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS, § 13.07(3) (1961).
4. Paxson v. Collins, 100 So.2d 672 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1958) ; Mexico Beach Corp. v. St. Joe
Paper Co., 97 So.2d 708 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1957).
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9 CASES NOTED
In cases involving rivers,5 an accretion touching , the land of several
riparian owners is divided among them as fairly as possible.6 Occasion-
ally, an accretion lengthwise in a river in front of several riparian tracts
will be contiguous to only one of them. In order to decide who owns the
formation, it is necessary to determine who has title to the bed of the
stream. 7 If the bed belongs to the riparian owners, each owns the portion
of the accretion that is over his portion of the river bottom, regardless
of where it touches the bank.8 But where the state owns the bed of the
river, accretions, probably belong to the owner of the bank they form
against, even when they extend lengthwise in the river in front of the
land of others. 9
Underlying. these rules for dividing accretions is the leading case
of Deerfield v. Arms,'" in which it was held that there are two main
objects to be kept in view when dividing accretions: first, that the parties
should have the same proportional share of the new land that they have
of the old;" and second, that each should retain his access to the water.2
It is this second objective that seems to have been uppermost in the
mind of the Supreme Court of Maryland when, in a decision, concerning
a fact pattern exactly like the one in the instant case, the court said:
To hold that the land involved in this case belonged to the
appellant [in a similar position as the instant plaintiff] would
entirely exclude the appellees from the bay, at least to the
extent the land has formed off their shore, and would deprive
them of their riparian rights in respect thereto.'8
Also, the Supreme Court of Florida, in Hayes v. Bowmdn,'4 an excellent
opinion concerning the riparian rights of two .adjoining waterfront
5. The instant case does not involve a river, but the court failed'to notice that distinc-
tion.
6. See generally Annot., 65 A.L.R.2d 143 (1959);'56 AM. JuR. Waters § 477 (1947);
93 C.J.S. Waters §, 76 (1956); 65 C.J.S. Navigable Waters:§ 82 (1950).
7. In the majority of states, including Florida (see statute cited note 1 supra), title to
the bed of navigable streams is in the state, while in the other states, riparian owners
have title to the bed. See generally Annot., 54 A.L.R.2d 643, 646-650 (1957) ; 56 AM. JuR.
Waters § 453 (1.947).
8. St. Louis v. Rutz, 138 U.S. 226 (1891) ; see Annot., 54 A.L.R.2d 643 (1957).
9. This rule can only be found by examining the cases concerning accretions to islands
in rivers, as research has not unearthed any reported cases involving this set of facts along
the banks of a river whose bed is state owned. E.g., Van Dusen Inv. Co. v. Western Fishing
Co., 63 Ore. 7, 124 Pac. 677, aff'd on rehearing, 63 Ore. 7, 126 Pac. 604 (1912) ; see generally
Annot., 54 A.L.R.2d 643 (1957). We shall see more of this dubious rule later. See also McGill
v. Thrasher, 221 Ky. 798, 299 S.W. 955 (1927); Archer v. Southern Ry., 114 Miss.- 403, 75
So. 251 (1917). See generally Annot., 54 A.L.R.2d 643, 654 (1957).
10. 17 Pick. 41, 28 Am. Dec. 766 (Mass. 1853).
11. This objective may not apply to the instant case, where the accretion does not
come in contact with the defendant's land.
12. This is one of the basic riparian rights. See Fla. STAT. § 271.09 (1961) ; 6 PoWEL,
REAL PROPERTY 589 n.37 (1958).
13. Waring v. Stinchcomb, 141 Md. 569, 572, 119 Atl. 336, 340 (1922).
14. 91 So.2d 795 (Fla. 1957).
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owners, said that in any given case concerning riparian or littoral rights,
the court must necessarily give due consideration to the correlative rights
of adjoining upland owners. 5
Yet, in holding for the plaintiff in the instant case, the court looked
solely to the fact that the state owned the submerged land in front of
the property, using a rule that has thus far been used only to determine
ownership of accretions to islands in rivers, rather than along the
shore of an open sea. If the court is correct, this indicates that riparian
rights such as ingress and egress are now determined by ownership of
the submerged land. It is difficult to reconcile this concept with the
well-established rule, mentioned in Hayes, that, "[L]ittoral or riparian
rights are appurtenances to ownership of the uplands. They are not
founded on ownership of the submerged lands."' 6
It is submitted that the court erred in the following respects: First,
a rule which applies only to islands in a river was applied to the shore of
the Gulf of Mexico; second, the defendant's riparian rights were com-
pletely disregarded; third, the rationale provided by the Supreme Court
of Maryland17 was ignored.
It is expected that when the sea washes the land, the results will
be arbitrary, but one expects more than caprice from a court of law.
WARREN M. SALOMON
INSURANCE-EFFECTIVE DATE DETERMINED BY PREMIUM
PAYMENT AND DELIVERY
The plaintiff's husband applied for a life insurance policy from the
defendant. The date of issue' was October 28, 1959. The policy was
delivered to the plaintiff and her husband on November 24, 1959, when
one month's premium was paid. On December 30, 1959, the insured died.
The defendant contended that the effective date of the policy was October
28, 1959, as stated on the face of the policy, and that the policy lapsed
on December 28th,2 two days before the insured died.' The trial court
15. Id. at 802.
16. Ibid.
17. Note 13 supra.
1. 44 C.J.S. Insurance § 262 (1945). "The words 'issue,' 'issuance,' and 'issued,' in
reference to an insurance policy, are used in different senses, sometimes as meaning the
preparation and signing of the instrument by the officers of the company, as distinguished
from its delivery to the insured, and sometimes as meaning its delivery and acceptance
whereby it comes into full effect and operation as a binding mutual obligation."
2. Sixty days after October 28, 1959-thirty days coverage for which premium had
been paid plus the thirty-day grace period usually found in the standard life insurance
policy.
3. Carolina Life Ins. Co. v. DuPont, 141 So.2d 624, 625 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962). But in
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